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Abstract. In any new chemical process development and design, process safety 
is a critical aspect to be considered besides economic and technical feasibility of 
the manufacture of the product. A lack of proper hazard assessment during the 
design phase may later result in accidents with disastrous consequences to 
workers, the public as well as the environment. Many methods have been 
introduced to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the safety level of processes. 
Despite the availability of a large amount of methods, a systematic framework 
that details guidelines for hazard identification, risk assessment, safety measure 
design, and safe critical decision-making is still missing. To address this issue, 
the main objective of this study was to propose a systematic framework that 
outlines comprehensive guidelines for assessing the safety performance of 
processes based on information from the piping and instrumentation diagram 
(P&ID). Apart from proposing the framework, appropriate strategies for 
minimizing safety hazards and risks are also recommended. In addition, the user 
is assisted in selecting the most appropriate assessment method according to his 
or her needs and the scope and constraints of the assessment. A case study is 
presented to illustrate the application of the proposed framework. 
Keywords: chemical processes; hazard and risk assessment; piping and 
instrumentation diagram (P&ID); process safety; systematic framework.  
1 Introduction 
Chemical industries, especially petrochemical and related industries, are ever 
expanding to fulfill global market demand. However, the increasing number of 
industrial chemical processes may cause a large number of accidents. Process 
safety engineering plays an important role in reducing the incidence of 
unexpected toxic release and other accidents at chemical facilities [1]. This 
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could easily be done during the design of chemical processes via different 
approaches, such as hazard identification and analysis strategies, risk 
assessment and evaluation, safety measures, and safe critical decision-making. 
A conventional process design lifecycle starts with screening the chemical 
reaction pathway and ends with the stage of producing the desired chemical 
product. To allow better communication between engineers, a flow diagram is 
normally used to represent the process. Flow diagrams can be separated into 
three types: (i) the block flow diagram (BFD), (ii) the process flow diagram 
(PFD), and (iii) the process and instrumentation diagram (P&ID). 
The first document to be produced during the design stage is the BFD. This is a 
simplified flowsheet that shows the main steps of the process, which is depicted 
using rectangular blocks with input and output flow streams. In addition, it 
specifies operating conditions (temperature and pressure) and other important 
parameters, such as conversion and percentage of yield (PFD), which is the 
second outcome to be constructed after BFD. The PFD contains the bulk of 
process information necessary for the design of the chemical process and also 
carries more information than the BFD. The PFD also provides the relationships 
between major components, subsystems and the stream flow between them. 
Finally, the most detailed flow diagram is the P&ID. The P&ID is a type of 
documentation in the form of a diagram that acts as a reference point during the 
development of industrial processes, mainly in the chemical industry. It 
includes the arrangement of the process equipment, piping, pumps, instruments, 
valves and other fittings (see Table 1). Note that P&ID carries sufficient 
information to describe the piping and instrument details used in the process. 
Among the three types of diagrams, the last one, the P&ID, is the subject of this 
paper, since it is a crucial engineering document in the chemical process design 
stage. As stated in Kidam, et al. [2], most critical design errors that occur 
concern the construction materials, the protection system, the utilities setup and 
equipment sizing. These are all represented in the P&ID. As a result, several 
researchers have attempted to develop methods for ensuring an adequate level 
of protection against unexpected events by using process information generated 
from the P&ID. These are described in textbooks as well as in guidelines. Based 
on safety level assessment using the P&ID, there are various existing hazard 
identification and risk assessment methods that can be applied to evaluate 
process safety and other problems related to chemical processes. Among the 
frequently used methods are Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Failure 
Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), MOND Index, Fire and Explosion Index 
(F&EI), Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) and Quantitative Risk Assessment 
(QRA [2]. Among these, HAZOP is the most used in chemical process 
industries (CPI [3]. As stated by Taylor [4], it is usual to carry out HAZOP with 
P&ID to check if a design is safe in light of the ability to detect errors up to 
95%. Meanwhile, the main purpose of F&EI (1987), which was introduced by 
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Dow Chemical Company, is to identify equipment that is likely to contribute to 
the creation of incidents. In addition, CEI (1987) was developed by Dow 
Chemical Company to be used as a method of rating relative acute health hazard 
(toxicity hazard) threats to people within chemical plants. Meanwhile, QRA has 
gained wide acceptance as a powerful tool to identify and assess significant 
sources of risk and to evaluate alternative risk control measures in chemical 
industries [5]. Unfortunately, the application of QRA in chemical process 
design is difficult due to the greater diversity of processes, hazardous materials, 
and equipment types in chemical process industries (CPI) [6]. However, after a 
detailed analysis, we note that six process safety assessment methods, including 
inherent safety and risk assessment methods, are suitable to evaluate process 
safety based on the P&ID. The method selection is based on the parameters 
involved in the methods that directly relate to the information available from the 
P&ID. The details and principles of each method used in this study are 
explained in the methodology section. 
Table 1 Information to be included in constructing Piping and Instrumentation 
Diagram (P&ID) [7]. 
Item Process Information 
Equipment Summary details of each unit 
 Spare units 
 Parallel units 
Piping Major and minor bypass line 
 Sizes (use standard size) 
 Schedule (thickness) 
 Construction materials 
 Insulation (thickness and type) 
Instruments Indicators, recorders, and 
controllers display instrument lines 
Utilities Entrance utilities  
 Exit utilities 
 Exit-to-waste utilities 
As discussed above, many methods and approaches have been developed for 
assessment of the safety level in different process design stages. However, there 
are no comprehensive guidelines on safety assessment that have the ability to 
guide or assist the user in selecting an appropriate method based on time and 
budget constraints, data availability, target of assessment, and expected 
accuracy of the final results. Therefore, the main goal of this research was to 
propose a systematic framework and comprehensive guidelines for safety 
evaluation and mitigation strategies based on data available in the P&ID. By 
using a heuristic framework that acts as a guideline, any hazard present should 
be minimized or eliminated. In addition, it can expedite projects directly and 
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benefit the analyzer indirectly. Apart from that, early hazard and risk 
assessment allows early planning for strategies and engineering controls to 
either eliminate hazards or mitigate their consequences. 
The remaining section of this paper is organized as follows: the guidelines on 
how to select an appropriate safety assessment method and hazard or risk 
minimization strategy are explained in detail in the following section. After that, 
a P&ID-based case study is presented to illustrate the proposed framework. 
Finally, the conclusion and future work are given. 
2 Methodology 
Before presenting the developed framework, a brief description of the 
systematic organization of this study is given in the following sub-sections. 
Well-ordered steps were constructed, starting from reviewing and classifying 
available process safety assessment methods until the stage of demonstrating 
the framework in a case study as summarized in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Overall research methodology steps. 
2.1 Selection of Methods 
In this work, seven safety assessment approaches, mainly index-based, were 
selected to be included in the framework. In order to understand the correlation 
between the methods, their basic elements were analyzed. Table 2 summarizes 
the information used for each assessment. Note that each index uses different 
parameters for assessment. Therefore, it is important for users to identify the 
required information for assessment based on their interest, data availability, 
time constraints as well as assessment scope. As can be seen from Table 2, the 
evaluation of hazard and risk assessment can be made more focused or more 
extensive based on the information items generated from the P&ID, which 
cover process piping and fittings, mechanical equipment as well as valves, etc. 
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A detailed discussion of the information used in each method can be found in 
Section 3. 
Table 2 Information (parameters) used in index methods. 
 DOW 
FEI 
DOW 
CEI 
HIRA SWe
HI 
I2SI 
Safety Data Needed FEDI TDI 
Process 
conditions 
Temperature ̷ ̷ ̷ ̷ ̷ ̷ 
 Pressure ̷ ̷ ̷ ̷ ̷ ̷ 
Fire and 
explosion 
Flash point   ̷  ̷  
 Fire point   ̷  ̷  
 
Auto-ignition 
temperature   ̷  ̷  
 NF ̷  ̷  ̷  
Toxicity 
Threshold limit 
value (TLV)       
 NH    ̷ ̷  
Reaction and 
decomposition 
Heat of 
reaction ̷  ̷  ̷  
 NR ̷  ̷  ̷  
Inventory Mass balance ̷ ̷ ̷ ̷ ̷ ̷ 
Equipment or 
unit operation 
Equipment 
dimensions 
(height, length, 
diameter) 
 ̷ ̷  ̷ ̷ 
 
Construction 
material ̷  ̷  ̷ ̷ 
Piping 
Pipe 
dimensions 
(diameter, 
thickness 
radius, area) 
 ̷ ̷  ̷ ̷ 
Process controls 
Instrument 
systems ̷ ̷    ̷ 
Others Safety systems ̷ ̷   ̷ ̷ 
 
Preliminary 
design layout ̷ ̷ ̷ ̷ ̷  
 
Preliminary 
human 
population data 
   ̷ ̷ ̷ 
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Table 3 Characteristics of index-based methods. 
Ref. No. 
Type of 
Assessment 
Hazard to 
be 
Assessed 
Outcome of Assessment (Depend 
Variable) 
[8,9] 
Semi 
quantitative 
Fire & 
explosion 
i. Magnitude of hazard that would 
result from an incident in a 
process plant. 
Damage factor that represents the 
overall effect of fire plus damage 
resulting from a release of 
flammable or combustible 
material. 
ii. Ranking the process unit based on 
the magnitude of hazard. 
[8,10] Quantitative Toxicity 
i. Airborne quantity of liquid and 
vapor release. 
ii. Radius of exposure determined in 
feet or meters. 
[6,9]  
Semi 
quantitative 
Toxicity 
i. Damage radius of the area getting 
affected by toxic load. 
ii. Magnitude of hazard that would 
result from an incident in a 
process plant. 
iii. Ranking the process unit based on 
the magnitude of hazard. 
[6,9] 
Semi 
quantitative 
Fire & 
explosion 
i. Damage radius of the area getting 
affected by considering physical 
operation units, chemical reaction 
units, transportation units and 
others hazardous units. 
ii. Magnitude of hazard that would 
result from an incident in a 
process plant. 
iii. Ranking the process unit based on 
the magnitude of hazard. 
[9,11] 
Semi 
quantitative 
Fire, 
explosion 
& toxicity 
i. Damage radius of the area getting 
affected by flammable material 
and toxic load. 
ii. Ranking the process unit based on 
the magnitude of hazard. 
[9,12] 
Semi 
quantitative 
Fire, 
explosion 
& toxicity 
i. Damage radius of the area getting 
affected by flammable material 
and toxic load. 
Table 3 summarizes the characteristic of the selected index-based methods. It is 
noted that the selected methods are mainly semi-quantitative and quantitative 
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methods. Quantitative methods are able to provide numerical values for 
evaluating and analyzing the relationships between independent and dependent 
variables in detail. As a result, the user is able to establish cause and effect at 
the end of the assessment. Meanwhile, a semi-quantitative method is used when 
the parameters cannot be quantified, whereas opinions based on information 
that has already been gathered are acceptable. The second characteristic of the 
methods included in this study refers to the types of hazard to be assessed by 
each method. Basically, there are three common hazards in chemical industries, 
i.e. fire, explosion and toxicity. There are methods that only focus on one 
hazard (e.g. F&EI and CEI) but most of them cover all types of hazard (e.g. 
HIRA-TDI, HIRA-FEDI, SWeHI and I2SI).  
In addition to that, different methods have different ways of determining the 
margin of safety in a particular process. Therefore, the last characteristic of the 
index-based methods to be investigated in this work is the outcome of the 
assessment. This refers to the effect of dependent variables. As can be seen 
from Table 3, it is apparent that most of the methods have the ability to rank a 
process unit based on the level of hazard. Apart from that, most of the methods 
are formulated to determine whether a particular design is safe or unsafe, except 
CEI. This can be done by evaluating the damage radius, which refers to the 
hazard distance that is affected by the process unit. 
2.2 Designation of Systematic Framework for Process Safety 
Assessment 
In this work, well-ordered steps describing the scenario of this study are 
presented to illustrate the proposed framework, as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 
shows the framework for process safety assessment based on different types of 
process information. Technically, this framework is an extension of the hazard 
identification and risk assessment procedure from the Guidelines for Hazard 
Evaluation Procedures [13]. According to the Guidelines for Hazard 
Evaluation Procedures, the assessment starts with interpreting the process 
background or operation unit by gathering extensive information pertaining to 
the equipment or process of interest. This is essential because if data on the 
applicable equipment or process are not available, then risk assessment cannot 
be fully applied. Therefore, in making a comprehensive framework, the 
information can be classified into three forms, i.e. chemical and process 
properties (MSDS), PFD data, and P&ID data, according to the design stages, 
as shown in Table 4. Note that in order to perform P&ID-based assessment, the 
chemical and process properties as well as the PFD data must be available. 
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Figure 2  Framework for process safety assessment based on different types of 
process information. 
Table 4 Process information in different design stages. 
Research & Development 
Design Stage 
Preliminary Process 
Design Stage 
Basic Engineering Design 
Stage 
BFD 
MSDS 
Reaction steps 
Reaction conditions 
Stoichiometric equation 
Product yield 
Reaction rate 
Types of chemicals 
All data from the R&D 
stage 
PFD 
Major unit operations 
Operating conditions 
Mass & energy 
Simulation data 
Data on preliminary 
equipment sizing 
Preliminary selection of 
construction material 
Selection of process 
transfer equipment (pump, 
valve) 
Preliminary site selection 
All data from R&D and 
preliminary stage 
P&ID 
Data on process design of 
equipment and piping 
system 
Preliminary layout design 
Utilities design 
Design of process transfer 
equipment 
An important step in the hazard and risk evaluation procedure as shown in 
Figure 1 is risk acceptance. This is extended by introducing the ISD keywords 
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for hazard and risk reduction: i) minimization, ii) substitution, iii) moderation, 
and iv) simplification. In case it is impossible to reduce the hazard or risk 
through these keywords, re-assessment towards the process or operation unit 
can be conducted by revising the process safety information. Otherwise, once 
the assessment is done for a given process or selected operation unit, the same 
steps are repeated for the other operation units. The details of the assessments 
methods as well as their mitigation strategies are discussed in the following 
section. 
3 Comprehensive Guideline for Hazard and Risk Evaluation 
and Mitigation Strategies based P&ID 
As mentioned in the previous section, all safety data to be assessed are first 
identified based on the P&ID. This is followed by selecting an appropriate 
method based on data availability, scope and limitations during assessment. 
Generally, all methods need to identify and select the operation unit to be 
assessed before the assessment. Nevertheless, it is clear that different methods 
have different ways of evaluating the safety hazards. Therefore, seven methods 
are preferred to be included in this stage, which deal with the piping process and 
equipment level. Most of these methods are tailored to determine whether a 
particular design is safe or unsafe, except CEI. CEI is formulated to evaluate the 
quantity of toxic release in the form of liquid or gas. Generally, a detailed 
assessment of the three major hazards in chemical industries (fire, explosion and 
toxic release) can be performed during this stage, which leads to a more 
comprehensive result. Still, each method has its own capabilities in assessing 
hazards; either one hazard (e.g. toxic release only) or a combination of hazards. 
There are 4 out of the 7 methods that only focus on one hazard, i.e.: F&EI and 
FEDI (fire and explosion hazard); and CEI and TDI (toxic release). Meanwhile, 
three other methods, SWeHI, I2SI and HIRA, cover all types of hazards. 
Nonetheless, each of them has different criteria in performing safety assessment 
and has its own limitations. In F&EI, the estimation of penalties for determining 
the index value are independent on the process unit, whereas in FEDI the 
estimation of penalties depends on the operation unit type. Apart from that, the 
input data for FEDI require preliminary plant layout data such as the distance 
between operation units, which makes it more comprehensive compared to 
F&EI. For CEI and TDI, both methods measure the toxicity level by calculating 
the hazard distance (meters). TDI includes data on population density, which 
cannot be easily obtained during this stage. An expert is needed to decide the 
population number used in the calculation of TDI based on experience with 
similar site characteristics. Therefore, CEI is easier to use for assessing the 
toxicity level compared to TDI. As for the last three methods in this stage, 
HIRA, SWeHI and I2SI, the similarities between these methods can be seen 
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from their capabilities in assessing the three major hazards in chemical process 
industries mentioned before. On the other hand, there are also significant 
differences between these methods. In SWeHI, the values of fire, explosion and 
toxicity hazard are compared and a higher value is given more priority for 
further assessment. Meanwhile, in HIRA and I2SI, the values of fire, explosion 
and toxicity hazard are considered in order to allocate the rank of the process 
unit to be evaluated. In other words, users of SWeHI are able to decide which 
hazard should be prioritized, either fire, explosion or toxicity, before they 
perform mitigation strategies through ISD keywords. Unlike HIRA, SWeHI and 
I2SI take into consideration all control measures during their assessment. It can 
be said that SWeHI and I2SI are more systematic and reliable methods since 
they take into account a larger number of parameters for hazard quantification 
compared to HIRA. A detailed explanation of the scope, the parameters affected 
during assessment, and the output data of each method is given in the following 
paragraph.  
The Fire & Explosion Index (FE&I) provides a comprehensive assessment to 
determine the areas of greatest loss potential in a particular process or operation 
unit. At the beginning of the assessment, the material factor (MF) is determined 
based on the reactivity hazard rating (NF) and flammability hazard rating (NR), 
which can be obtained from MSDS. Next, the process unit hazard factor (F3) is 
calculated. The value of F3 is computed based on the general process hazard 
factor (F1) and special process hazard factor (F2). The general process hazard 
comprises six factors that can affect the safety level of the process unit 
examined in the assessment. The six listed factors are the most commonly 
occurring process conditions based on past incidents. For example, exothermic 
chemical reaction is the first factor to be estimated for factor F1. This factor is 
determined based on four classes of exotherms, i.e. mild, moderate, critical and 
particularly sensitive. In case a process reaction in a process unit is found in one 
of these classes, a penalty value for that class is allocated to that process unit. 
Note that this factor can only be assigned to reactors. In addition, evaluation of 
F2 should be conducted to evaluate the safety risk due to specific process 
conditions. Thus, there are 12 factors that can contribute to major fire and 
explosions incidents. It is noted that the penalty for each process condition is 
determined based on criteria for chemical and process conditions. For instance, 
since toxicity is an inherent property of a material, according to the F&EI guide, 
the first factor for special process hazard assessment that should be evaluated is 
the toxic material factor. The penalty for this factor is determined based on the 
toxicity hazard rating (NH). For other factors we refer to the Dow guide. Note 
that the higher the hazard level a process unit receives, the higher the penalty. 
Besides that, the penalty value is ignored if no hazard exists in the process unit. 
After that, the process unit hazard, F3, is obtained by multiplying F1 and F2. 
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Finally, MF is multiplied by F3 to determine the F&EI value for the process 
unit. 
The Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) is a simple method that provides a rating 
for toxicity hazard and hazard distance by evaluating the quantity of toxic 
release in the form of liquid or gas. Initially, the Emergency Response Planning 
Guideline (ERPG) value is identified from MSDS. This value refers to the 
estimation of the concentration of a material (chemical) from which people may 
experience health effects if they are exposed to it for 1 hour. Meanwhile, 
airborne quantity (AQ) is calculated based on types of release, whether in the 
form of liquid or gas. For gas form, the estimation of AQ can be directly 
obtained based on temperature, pressure and pipe diameter of the process. In 
addition, the chemical and physical properties of the substances involved such 
as molecular weight and physical state are also considered in determining AQ. 
In the event of liquid release in the process, the evaluation of AQ starts by 
calculating the liquid release rate (L) based on the process conditions. The 
assessment is continued with the determination of the total liquid release rate 
(WT), which contributes to pool formation. Next, it has to be established 
whether the temperature under which the operation takes place is lower than the 
boiling point of the substances involved. In case the operating temperature is 
higher than the boiling point, the flash fraction (fv) is calculated based on latent 
heat vaporization (CP/CV), operating temperature and the boiling point of the 
substances. Thus, the assessment is continued directly by determining the value 
of AQf resulted from the flash fraction. In contrast, the pool area (Ap) is 
determined in case the operating temperature is lower than the boiling point of 
the substances involved. Note that Ap is affected by the density of the 
substances and the total liquid release rate (WT). After that, the AQp of the pool 
surface is calculated by considering the pool area, molecular weight, vapor 
pressure of the liquid, and pool temperature. It should be noted that pool 
formation is affected by the release of liquid at operating temperature lower 
than the boiling point. This scenario can occur in process piping as well as 
equipment. The AQ value for pool formation is the summation of AQf and 
AQp. For a detailed explanation of the calculation of AQ for liquid and gas 
form, we refer to the Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) Guide published by the 
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (1994). Note that since the maximum 
CEI value is 1000, if the calculated CEI is higher than 1000, CEI is set to 1000.  
The Hazard Identification and Ranking System (HIRA) is combination of two 
indices, the Fire and Explosion Damage Index (HIRA-FEDI) and the Toxic 
Damage Index (HIRA-TDI). The scope of the assessment by HIRA-FEDI is to 
quantify the damage radius in the event of fire and explosion hazard. In 
quantification of HIRA-FEDI, the first step is classifying the process units into 
five classes based on their mode of operation: storage units, physical operations 
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units, chemical reactions units, transportation units, and other units that may be 
harmful. To evaluate the HIRA-FEDI value for these respective units, three 
energy factors have to be determined. F1 represents chemical energy, while F2 
and F3 represent physical energy. The assessment is continued for each type of 
unit. Note that each class unit has different parameters that can be affected in 
that unit. For instance, the evaluation HIRA-FEDI for storage units is affected 
by temperature, pressure, location of nearest hazardous unit, quantity of 
chemicals, characteristics of chemicals, and density of units. Each parameter is 
assigned its own penalties based on the particular scenario. For example, the 
penalties of temperature for storage units is determined based on operating 
temperature, auto-ignition temperature, flash point, and fire point. Thus, the 
value of HIRA-FEDI is computed based on energy factors and penalties. In 
contrast, HIRA-TDI provides measurements in terms of the radius of the area 
that will be affected by toxic release. Factor G is first determined by considering 
the mass flowrate and release condition of the substances. The assessment is 
continued by assigning penalties for other parameters that may contribute to 
toxic release, such as rupture, leak and spill. These parameters comprise 
operating temperature, operating pressure, vapor density, toxicity of chemicals, 
and site characteristics. Finally, factor G and penalties are combined to obtain 
the HIRA-TDI value. A detailed calculation of HIRA-FEDI and HIRA-TDI can 
be found in the original work by Khan and Abbasi (1998a) in [6].  
The Safety Weighted Hazard Index (SWeHI) is an extension of HIRA with 
additional safety precautions as part of the assessment. Determination of factors 
B1 and B2 is the first step in this method. B1 represents the fire and explosion 
hazard evaluation, while B2 represents the toxicity hazard evaluation. 
Technically, the evaluation of B1 and B2 is similar to HIRA-FEDI and HIRA-
TDI. The values of B1 and B2 are compared and the higher value will be chosen 
as factor B. The assessment is continued by allocating a credit factor based on 
required safety measures for the process unit. At this step, safety measures are 
divided into two parts: controlling the damage potential of the individual unit 
and reducing the frequency of occurrence of unwanted events. In quantification 
of the credits for controlling the damage potential of the individual unit, three 
types of control measures are applied, i.e. emergency resource planning (ERP), 
disaster management plan (DMP), and other control measures. Meanwhile, for 
reduction of accident frequency, four control strategies are applied: process 
control system, detection devices, emergency control measures, and human 
error reduction. A detailed discussion of the quantification of safety measures 
can be found in the original work of Khan, et al. (2001) in [11].  
The Integrated Inherent Safety Index (I2SI) was introduced to predict the 
damage potential of a process by considering process and hazard control 
measures. Based on this method, both safety and environmental aspects are 
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taken into consideration. In this work, only safety hazards were evaluated, Thus, 
only the safety aspect of I2SI is reviewed. Chemical and process data are 
needed in this method, which can be divided into four groups: i) chemical 
substances, ii) operating conditions (temperature and pressure), iii) inventory 
(mass balance), and iv) the process control system. I2SI divides the safety 
aspect into a hazard index (HI) and an inherent safety potential index (ISPI). 
The HI is first calculated based on the damage index (DI), which focuses on the 
flammability and toxicity of the involved substances. Therefore, the chemical 
properties of each chemical substance are collected. The calculation of the DI is 
similar to that of HIRA-FEDI for flammability substances. For toxicity 
substances, HIRA-TDI is applied. The assessment is continued by determining 
the process hazard and control index (PHCI). The purpose of this sub-index is 
to evaluate various add-on processes and hazard control systems that are 
required or already part of the system. The selection of the safety system is 
based on the requirements of the process unit. Finally, the value of HI is 
obtained by dividing DI and PHCI. The second step is computation of ISPI by 
dividing the inherent safety index (ISI) value with PHCI. In order to compute 
the value of ISI, first a selection of appropriate guidewords based on the needs 
of the process unit is made. Simultaneously, a selection based on the extent of 
applicability of each guideword is performed to allocate the PHCI value. The 
extent of applicability of guidewords is necessary to know for any control 
system to be added to the process unit. For a detailed explanation, we refer to 
the original work of Khan and Amyotte in [12]. 
After allocating all parameters with their individual scores, the last part is 
comparing the evaluated scores with the respective benchmark value or hazard 
or risk acceptance. In cases where the risk or hazard value is lower than the 
benchmark value, the user has to try out all possible combinations of all four 
ISD keywords to reduce or eliminate the hazard as much as possible. This 
mitigation strategy is focused on materials as well as process conditions that are 
less hazardous. Note that alternative process chemistry and chemical substances 
are not included in this discussion, since most of the chemicals or solvents have 
already been confirmed and finalized. Therefore, the modifications are focused 
on the process, operation units, storage tanks and piping system.  
1. Minimization can be done by reducing the amount of piping, pipe 
connectors and gaskets. This can also be done by minimize the number of 
elbows, tees, valves, fittings and other obstructions in the piping system, 
while simplifying the layout (P&ID) as much as possible. This can 
potentially minimize friction losses in the piping system and hence reduce 
pressure drop as well as velocity. At some point, friction can cause a 
decrease in pumping pressure and velocity, which adversely affects 
pumping efficiency. Apart from that, reducing the hole diameter of the 
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piping could be another option. By doing this, the amount of released toxic 
and flammable materials would be minimized. 
2. Substitution can be considered for pipes, vessels and pump by replacing 
their material with an alternative that is able to resist erosion and corrosion. 
Another common strategy involves using corrosion resistant materials, 
protective coatings and paints. Moreover, substitution can also be applied 
by replacing equipment with welded and leak-proof joints and connections 
to reduce the probability of loss of flammable or combustible material 
during the process.  
3. Moderation can be done by maximizing the use of welded pipes to create 
more benign conditions by reducing the probability of the occurrence of 
hazardous conditions such as leaks. Instead of welding, installing fire 
protective insulation can also be part of a moderation strategy. For example, 
in case the pump that transfers flammable substances from the reactor to the 
distillation column fails catastrophically, it would cause the formation of a 
pool due to the release of a large quantity of flammable material. As a 
result, the pool surrounding the reactor and distillation column could ignite 
and form an intense fire. At this point, the only barrier between the surface 
of the process unit and the fire is the thermal insulation, which acts as a fire-
protective insulator. Moderation can also be performed by installing proper 
drainage to ensure that spills of flammable materials are carried away from 
the equipment and potential sources of ignition. 
4. Simplification is the last mitigation strategy option after performing hazard 
assessment based on P&ID. This could be performed by combining a 
number of process operations, leading to fewer transfer operations and less 
pipework. For instance, in some cases a complex pipework can have a high 
potential for equipment failure or operation error. Therefore, by simplifying 
the pipework, the level of hazard in the process may be reduced or 
minimized. 
Overall, these mitigation strategies affect the risk or hazard level by reducing its 
intensity, energy level, inventory as well as concentration of hazardous 
substances released into the surroundings. Apart from that, the parameters 
(dependent variables) of each method influence the outcome of the assessment 
(independent variables) through these strategies.  
4 Case Study: Benzene Distillation Process Design  
A benzene distillation process design was used as a case study to illustrate the 
applicability of the proposed comprehensive guidelines in conducting safety 
assessment based on P&ID. The P&ID for the benzene distillation plant is 
shown in Figure 3. This process involves four chemical substances, i.e. 
benzene, toluene, methane and hydrogen gas. From a safety point of view, most 
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of chemical substances in the process are flammable and toxic to varying 
degrees. However, based on the mass balance provided by Turton, et al. [7], 
benzene is the major component by mass, whereas the rest are minor 
components. Therefore, benzene was selected for evaluation in this case study. 
Apart from that, there is a significant number of other safety issues from column 
malfunction histories based on Kister’s surveys [14]. Therefore, based on the 
information provided by this case study, the Dow Index was deemed to be the 
most suitable method for evaluating the safety level using P&ID information. 
All information needed for this assessment was gathered directly from Turton, 
et al. [7]. The results of the assessment are as follows. 
 
Figure 3 Piping and instrumentation diagram of benzene distillation 
process design [7]. 
In the CEI evaluation, streams 10 and 13, which are connected to the benzene 
tower (T-101), were selected to illustrate accident scenarios that could occur 
due to pipe leaking. Consequently, CEI evaluation was performed for liquid as 
well as vapor release. The ERPG/EEPG values of benzene were first identified, 
which are already listed in the CEI Guide. The ratio of specific heat capacity to 
vaporization heat (Cp/Hv) is unknown. Therefore, based on the 
recommendation in the CEI Guide, 0.0044 was used in this assessment. For the 
calculation of vapor release, the airborne quantity (AQ) was 47.87 kg/s, based 
on three dependent variables: the hole diameter of the pipe (304.8 mm), 
absolute pressure (251.47 kPa), and operating temperature (147 °C). Thus, the 
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CEI value for vapor release was computed at 207.05. Meanwhile, the hazard 
distance based on ERPG-2 was 2070.5 m. For the liquid release calculation, one 
parameter could not be determined from the available information, i.e. the 
height of the liquid benzene on the tray. Therefore, the height of the liquid 
benzene on the tray was estimated using the Francis Weir formula, which gave 
40.22 mm. Then, the value of AQ was obtained at 114.03 kg/s based on two 
dependent variables: the hole diameter of the pipe (76.22 mm) and the height of 
the liquid (40.22 mm). Finally, the CEI value and the hazard distance for liquid 
release were obtained at 319.56 and 3195.66 m, respectively. 
In the F&EI evaluation, the base material was benzene, which is already listed 
in the FEI database. Therefore, the MF of benzene was set to a value of 16. 
Then, the value of F1 was evaluated based on the mode of benzene handling 
and transfer. Hence, by looking at the chemical properties of benzene, class 1 
flammability was selected, which was counted as 0.50. Finally, the general 
process hazard factor, F1, was calculated as 1.50. The computation of F2 is 
based on five items to be considered in this case study. Firstly, toxic material 
was evaluated as 0.4 based on the NH value, which was 2. Chemically, benzene 
is a highly flammable material and it is easily ignited under most ambient 
temperature conditions. Therefore, the ‘process upset’ and ‘always in 
flammable range’ criteria in the Special Process Hazards section were selected. 
This yielded a penalty of 1.10 for operation within or near the flammable range. 
The operating pressure was 43.51 psig, which yielded a penalty of 0.23 for 
pressure criteria. The penalty for quantity of flammable material was quantified 
based on the HC factor, which was directly obtained from the FEI database and 
the quantity of the material. Based on the F&EI database, the value of HC for 
benzene is 17.3 x 10
-3
 and the amount of benzene was 439324 lb, which gave a 
penalty of 0.15. Apart from that, corrosion and erosion issues were also 
included in the assessment. As a result, a corrosion range of 0.005-0.127 
mm/year was chosen, giving a minimum penalty of 0.10. In addition to 
corrosion and erosion issues, leakage can be another problem occurring in most 
of the chemical process. Therefore, a minor leak was chosen, which yielded a 
penalty of 0.1. Another hazard to be included in this assessment was fired 
equipment. Since a heat exchanger (E-106) is located within the process area 
and there is a possibility that the material in the process unit could be released 
above its flash point, a minimum penalty of 0.10 was given. With these data and 
assumptions, the value of F&EI was obtained at 49.92. Then, the magnitude of 
the potential hazard was determined based on the rating table from the Dow 
F&EI guide to allocate the degree of hazard. The FEI value of 49.92 represents 
the level ‘light’ as the result of this assessment.  
As stated previously, hazard or risk mitigation strategies can be implemented 
through ISD keywords for improving the safety level of the benzene distillation 
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plant design. A modification is proposed by minimizing the hole diameter of the 
piping, which affects the CEI value. In order to illustrate how the minimization 
strategy was conducted in this case study, the relationship between the hole 
diameter of the piping and the CEI values for vapor and liquid release are 
presented in Figure 4(a) and 4(b), respectively. For example, for a pipe diameter 
of 2 inch (50.8 mm), the CEI value drops to 209.65 for liquid release. It is 
apparent that the hole diameter has a significant influence on CEI. Apart from 
that, by reducing the hole diameter, the total amount of benzene ejected would 
be minimized. This observation is particularly important in the selection of an 
optimum piping design for processes handling hazardous materials. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4 Effect of hole diameter on CEI for benzene: (a) vapor release, (b) 
liquid release. 
5  Conclusion 
This work was devoted to proposing comprehensive guidelines for safety hazard 
assessment and mitigation strategies based on the P&ID. This was performed by 
integrating existing safety methods, i.e. index-based approaches that are deemed 
to be suitable for analyzing safety levels based on the P&ID information. The 
proposed guideline was proven to be successful in hazard reduction through 
ISD keywords as shown by our case study. The case study revealed that the 
developed framework successfully performed its function in determining the 
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most suitable method for predicting the hazard level of the process to be 
assessed. The aim of the case study was to determine the magnitude of the 
hazard that would result from an accident and the radius of exposure in a 
benzene distillation plant.  
The Dow Index (F&EI and CEI method) was selected and compared with other 
methods (I2SI, SWeHI, HIRA-FEDI, and HIRA-TDI). The magnitude of hazard 
was determined by using the FEI method, while the radius of exposure was 
calculated using the CEI method. The calculated FEI value (49.92) was found in 
the range of the level ‘light’, which is classified as an acceptable range. 
However, the calculated CEI value (270) for liquid (benzene) release was found 
to be higher than the critical CEI value (200). Therefore, among four ISD 
keywords, minimization was deemed to be the most suitable ISD keyword. This 
was conducted by reducing the hole diameter of the piping from 76.22 mm to 
50 mm, which resulted in a decrease of the CEI value to 177 (within the 
acceptable range). The reduction of the hole diameter also impacted the hazard 
distance, decreasing it from 2700 mm to 1770 mm.  
This means that the case study confirmed that the developed framework can be 
used as a guideline for selecting the most appropriate strategy in reducing the 
hazard level of the process to be evaluated. Other than that, the case study also 
confirmed that the developed framework can be applied as a decision-making 
tool in selecting an optimum design of processes handling hazardous materials. 
It is noticeable that early hazard and risk assessment allows early planning of 
strategies and engineering controls to either eliminate hazards or mitigate their 
consequences. Aside from reducing the hazard, the proposed guidelines also 
proves to be able to provide options to the user in selecting an appropriate 
method based on the scope, nature, interest, and limitations of his or her 
assessment. Therefore, the project can be expedited directly and benefit the 
analyzer indirectly. Apart from that, the developed framework can be used as a 
tool to prevent major accidents in chemical process industries, as part of seven 
core concepts to prevent major accidents, as stated by Amyotte in [15]. To 
enhance the applicability of the proposed guidelines, the PFD and a detailed 
plant layout can be included in a future work in order to extend these guidelines 
to cover all chemical process design stages. 
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